Cultural Exemptions or Liberation for All?

by Gabriel Schulz

When petitioning for the IP28 ballot initiative in Oregon, I’m occasionally asked by would-be signers “What about Native Americans?” Presumably, they are inquiring as to whether or not the initiative exempts Native peoples and practices from the proposed ban on slaughter, hunting, and fishing. Concerns regarding cultural exemptions are preceded by several animal fur bans and their contemporaneous exemptions enacted in recent years. Take, for example, California’s ban on the sale of new fur products as of 2023. Exempt from the ban are “fur product[s] used for traditional tribal, cultural, or spiritual purposes by a member of a federally recognized Native American tribe or a non-federally recognized California Native American tribe.” Cultural exemptions for other fur bans are remarkably similar, with greatest variance in jurisdiction. Other outstanding exemptions, such as those for cows, deer, sheep, goats, and taxidermy may elicit further analysis but I will not focus on them here.

Foremost, I will stress the assumptions about animals’ universal negative rights which undergird IP28. Non-human animals, being sentient persons bearing subjective witness to reality, are therefore in need of protection from actions which deny their ability and desire to live free from violence and enslavement. These negative rights are to be applied to all species and circumstances. For clarity, I will add that negative rights are to be upheld except for the exceedingly rare moments in which one’s right may be negated in order to protect the immediate rights of another. Such is the case of self defense, for which exemptions would remain.

So as to remain authentic to our values and protect all sentient beings, IP28 does not include culturally specific exemptions for any act of violence against an animal. I will further explore this fact due to the common expectation of such exemptions and my desire to elaborate on the values underneath what others may see as an egregious or accidental omission. Arguments in favor of cultural exemptions are myriad and counterarguments relatively scant, this is perhaps due to social sensibilities regarding what might be considered an imposition of Eurocentric ideals, once more, onto historically subordinated peoples .

For context, were Oregon to pass and implement IP28, the killing of animals by tribal members within federally recognized tribal lands would not be criminalized. Such lands and peoples are under the purview and precedence of federal and tribal government; Oregon state law does not apply. This brief description is not a rhetorical point but a fact of the existing legal framework. Jurisdictional limitations aside, IP28 seeks to protect animals from being killed as much as is possible by refusing identity- based exemptions. Tribal members acting within Oregon boundaries (and outside of tribal land) would be subject to the restrictions within IP28.

Favor for a cultural exemption usually comes with three basic assumptions. One, again, is that the attitudes towards animals inherent in IP28 are sourced from outside of Native culture and risk being hoisted upon them. The second assumption is a vaguely defined notion that Native Americans kill animals using methods that are excusably sustainable, ethical, natural, or even obtained with the consent of the animal. Lastly, and perhaps most fundamental, is the rarely examined assumption that it is the desires of humans which are most pressing and must be met in full (using animals as a strategy) before the needs of animals are to even be considered.

Let’s revisit the aforementioned cultural exemption included in California’s fur ban:

The wording itself may be an indication of the primary logic behind the cultural exemption. In the text are four key words: cultural, traditional, spiritual, and tribal. Why not “ethical” or “sustainable” or “fur obtained by consent”? Why is there no mention of an exact practice or even an explanation? One thing is clear: by using broad, ambiguous language (culture and tradition are umbrella terms which can include practically any activity) referring to institutions of identity, California’s fur ban has completely removed itself from the realm of Native American life and the slippery slope of colonial control. Here, then, we have the first major assumption at play.

The requests of IP28 are without precedent; at no point in recorded history have animal protections of such a radical nature been placed before voters or mandated through other means. No direct link can be made between IP28 (or animal rights activists in general) and a substantial pre-existing cultural attitude, certainly not of the “West” or “Eurocentrism” which are known to have pioneered industrial violence against animals and, like the rest of the world, remain entrenched in such industries. Violence against animals is a global phenomenon, pockets of animal rights supporters exist throughout the world, and IP28 is widely unpopular even in its state of origin, so it does not follow that IP28 contains a set of ideals specific to “The West”. What’s more, harm against animals is historically ubiquitous to the point that it can be claimed that any person or peoples the world over has a claim to a traditional, cultural, or spiritual purpose for killing animals.

While centuries of devastating imperialism have understandably inspired a second look at attitudes, forces, and laws affecting Native Americans yet seemingly sourced elsewhere, it does not necessarily rule out the push for universal dictums and the statutes which typically accompany them. While it is true that the passage of IP28 would result in specific moments in which a human (Native or not) chooses not to harm an animal solely because of restrictive law, this is an excellent example of protective use of legal force. This may initially be perceived as wholly imposing, especially when considering the hand of the law in our long histories of domination, but it may help to reframe this with the interests of the animal fully in mind. As an analogous example, consider the case of human on human killing. Globally, it is a crime to kill another human, and while this is technically an imposed order, it is agreed upon with near unanimity, and in it we find freedom from violence (at least in the ideal case). I can hardly imagine an instance in which we lament that a human who has killed (or not, perhaps due to fear of punishment) is unreasonably subject to an order not his own. The protections of negative rights cannot be guaranteed without the curtailing of the “right” to violate such rights. Again, though, we have a chance to reframe the whole issue. In refraining from killing other humans, we find that our need to be protected and to protect others is met. In this way, a restriction can be viewed as freedom itself, and when considering the desire of animals to remain alive, humans and animals alike can find freedom in the choice of a human (whether informed by legal statute or not) to refuse an act of violence against an animal.

Clearly, we seek to transform global cultural assumptions toward animals through popular discourse. Native Americans are not a monolith, and various persons within singular identity groups form differing values based on ever changing flows of information and introspection. Arguably, the very notion of Natives as an exempt class is a subjugation of its own, relegating “them” to a faraway place in which culture is static and needn’t mingle with “our” changing vision for the world. Native peoples are just as capable of cultural transformation as anyone else, and when considering that many seem to think that Native tradition holds relatively high “respect” for the life of an animal, there may be less in the way of persuasion toward a value of nonviolence.

The full text of IP28, in laying out the details of the Transitional Oversight Council tasked with distributing funds to help furnish a just transition (which you can read more about in our previous post), requires a representative of each of the 9 tribal governments in Oregon. This is because we recognize that the cessation of violence against animals everywhere will only come about when humans of every identity come to realize that they too desire to protect animals from harm. Debate regarding animals’ universal rights has only just begun. To preemptively determine that universal protections need not apply to certain people, groups, or animals is a contradiction in terms. Not only would an exemption be incongruent with our values, but it would serve to remove Native Americans from the conversation and impose an oversimplified expectation of their relations to animals.

Moving on, we face the second assumption, namely, that Native Americans kill animals the “right” way. Whether it is defined as “ethical,” “natural,” or even “traditional,” the terms often presented imply that there are a set of rules to be followed before violence against animals can reasonably fade from concern. The rules of such sanctioned violence are subject to ongoing, and sometimes endless, debate. We do acknowledge that there are methods to killing animals which are relatively sustainable and “reduce suffering” when compared to other types of violence. However, we reject these methods on the grounds of universal rights and with priority for the life of the animal.

Instead of rambling about the innumerable implications of “this” or “that” version of violence against animals, it will suffice to say that in reference to violence against sentient beings the value of universal negative rights need not pay attention to detail. Only when the condition of universal protection has been agreed upon shall we begin to examine and implement the manifold alternatives and their minutiae. The search for the “right” method of killing animals presents a false choice; there are only different ways of enforcing violence against animals, and it is in these differences that we affirm our ignorance.

The third, and most revealing assumption, is that the needs or desires of a human surpass those of any other species. This is made apparent by the preoccupations with impacts or distinctions between humans when considering animals’ rights; they are utterly lacking in the viewpoint of animals themselves. By accepting the premise that animals are sentient, it is straightforward enough to conclude that animals therefore desire protection from harm without consideration of whom exactly is doing the harming. Even more, animals don’t need to speak an advanced language to communicate their desires. The desperate squeals, jerks, and tears of an animal subject to violence are no subtle message. Animals have always communicated their needs, and it is with a respectful understanding of an animal’s desire to be free from violence that we advance the initiative. I find irony in the fact that it is humans alone who will decide the fate of millions of animals in Oregon. I’m reminded of the 6 times men alone were empowered to decide if women will be granted the right to vote through Oregon’s male-citizen initiative process.

While there will undoubtedly be a variety of human impacts to be mitigated, animals face an existential emergency of utmost immanence. When the animals crying out from death row are finally set free, we shall pivot to the question of human need and desire. I’ll refer again to our most recent post on our vision for a Humane Transition: “Seldom Discussed Sections of IP28, Part One: Transition Fund” by David Michelson, chief petitioner of IP28.

It has been suggested that a cultural exemption may speed along the passage of IP28 and therefore bring us closer to our aim, with a select few animals as necessary collateral damage. However, by adding exemptions in tow with popular demand, we risk distracting from the ultimate question of violence itself and thus compromise the very premise of the initiative. We may then refocus public attention by consistently requesting others to reconsider violence against animals as a concept of its own, at a remove from the question on methods of violence. IP28 seeks a newly robust paradigm in popular discourse explicitly pertaining to liberation for animalkind. IP28 will not merely tweak the permissions to mass injure animals under the guise of the law, but will instead challenge the very premise that humans can be justified in their actions against animals. An expectation of a cultural exemption may reflect the tendency of new laws to codify relatively minor changes in status quo. California’s fur ban is so laden with exemptions that it is arguably a mere reflection of the independent decline in new fur fashion. It isn’t “banning” fur per se, but rather solidifying which animals we already skin and how we have already chosen to skin them in the 21st century. The question IP28 poses is not about “How?” we might like to reinstitutionalize animal killing for a modern audience. What IP28 is requesting of Oregon is nothing short of a sweeping revolution in how we all relate to all species.

By focusing on the specific actions harming animals, and not the persons behind such acts, IP28 pursues universal rights for animals. Individuals (whether Native or not) will either choose to support or challenge IP28 according to their own convictions, and by refusing a cultural exemption, IP28 is encouraging a deeply meaningful question about how every Oregon voter would like to relate to animals. More to the point, though, an animal’s need to remain alive and protected from harm supersedes any stake in human identity or tradition, no matter how fraught.

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